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INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION:
A
SUMMARY OF THE CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN

PRACTICE AND

A

PROPOSED

FORMULA
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNIt

I
THE MEANING OF EXTRADITION IN THE UNITED STATES

Extradition is the process through which one state by virtue of
a legal process surrenders to another state an individual accused or
convicted of an offense outside the jurisdiction of the asylum state
and within the jurisdiction of the requesting state which is
competent to try and punish him and, accordingly, has demanded
his surrender for that purpose.'
Definitions of extradition have consistently emphasized an
interstate relationship predicated on sovereignty and bolstered by
reciprocity. Such a view clearly fails to appreciate the fact that
states should have an interest in combating crime and in seeing
that it does not go unpunished. In other words, aut dedere aut
punire.
International extradition has existed as early as the ancient
times of the Chaldeans, the Egyptians, and the Chinese, where each
international agreement was bound up in solemn, religious formulas
in the name of national gods. Thus, in the Eastern world, the
sanctity of international extradition pacts and the honoring of
requests by the heads of state have long been respected and viewed
as essential conditions in the life of national communities .
t Associate Professor of Law, De Paul University. Member of the Illinois and Washington, D.C. bars. A.B. 1955, College of the Holy Family (Cairo, Egypt); Lic. D. 1961, Cairo
University; J.D. 1964, Indiana University; LL.M. 1966, Lawyer's Institute of John Marshall
Law School.- ED.
1. Compare Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902), with "[L]'extradition est un acte
d'assistance judiciaire inter-etatique en matiere penale qui vise a transferer un individu
penalement poursuivi ou condanne du demaine de lasouverainete judiciare d'un Etat a celui
d'un autre Etat." 37 Revue Internationale de Droit Penal 362-63 (1966). See also 2 J.
MOORE, EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION §§ 516-20 (1891); Bassiouni, International Extradition in American Practiceand World Public Order, 36 TENN. L. REV. (1969).
2. Kutner, World Habeas Corpus and InternationalExtradition, 41 U. DEr. L.J. 525
(1964).
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Consistent with the ancient origin of international extradition
and the conviction of the Eastern nations that such pacts were not
only desirable but necessary is the fact that classical
authorities- Grotius, Vattel, and Burlemaqui-took the position
that extradition was a matter of right under the law of nations, and
that the asylum nation had the duty to surrender the accused to the
requesting nation
The history of international extradition in the Western world
has in no sense of the word paralleled that found in the Eastern
world. Up until the nineteenth century, the relatively new and
independent sovereign states of the West found no need for such
cooperative undertakings, and asylum was generally granted to
fugitives from justice. A sovereign community could enforce the
return of fugitives only by force of arms. Such history has given
rise to the prevailing, contemporary view that extradition is a
matter of favor or comity rather than a legal duty. In United
States v. Rauscher,4 the Supreme Court of the United States stated:
It is only in modern times that the nations of the earth have imposed
upon themselves the obligation of delivering up these fugitives
from justice to the States where their crimes were committed, for
trial and punishment. This has been done generally by treaties . ...
Prior to these treaties, and apart from them, . . . there was no welldefined obligation on one country to deliver up such fugitives to
another, and though such delivery was often made, it was upon the
principle of comity, . . . and it has never been recognized as among
those obligations of one government towards another which rest upon
established principles of international law.
In the United States under such a rule, it was the general
practice to neither ask for nor permit extradition. However, the
relative "shrinking" in the size of the earth, as a result of
technological breakthroughs in communication and particularly in
travel, brought about the death of the isolationism which had
previously characterized the United States. The trend toward
interdependency of nations and the desire to suppress crime gave
birth to the realization that close cooperation is required not only
3.

United States ex rel. Donnelly v. Mulligan, 74 F.2d 220, 221 (2d Cir. 1934); I L.
§ 327 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955).
119 U.S. 407, 411-12 (1886).
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between the various penal jurisdictions within one sovereign state,
but also internationally between sovereign nations. Thereafter
treaties for the extradition of persons charged with crime became
both more numerous and more extended in their scope. However,
the position of the United States remains basically that extradition
is an exercise of sovereignty, decided by the executive and
predicated on the reciprocity which is required by treaties and
noncontractual practice.
Therefore, since the American practice rests largely on treaties
wherein the mutuality of obligation exists, it is clear that
reciprocity is a conditio sine qua non. However, the nature of such
reciprocity does not lie in every aspect of the process, but in the
principle of mutuality of obligations, even though these obligations
may have different applications. The American position is that this
is not a question of fairness for the accused nor an individual right,
but rather a measure of state sovereignty. Thus, the state can waive
it, and the individual whose extradition is sought cannot insist upon
it.
Jay's treaty (1794) included the first international extradition
pact to which the United States was a party. The three bilateral
treaties adopted in 1961 and 1962 between the United States and
Sweden, Brazil, and Israel, brought to eighty-one the number of
bilateral extradition treaties between the United States and other
nations.5 The United States has bilateral treaties with all the Latin
American nations and, in addition, is a party to the Multilateral Convention of Extradition signed at Montevideo in December 1933. The
entry into effect of the treaty with Brazil in 1964 marked the completion of the chain of extradition treaties between the United States
and all of the nations of the Western hemisphere, and marked the end
of a haven for fugitive criminal offenders from the United States
that had existed in Brazil for half a century. Extradition treaties
with many of the new nations which have achieved independence in
the past several years have not yet been realized. However, general
treaties of extradition and some supplementary agreements between
the United States and Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom are said to be currently binding on the former
dependencies or dominions of these states,' even though it appears
5. See the enumeration of treaties at 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (Supp. III, 1964).
6. Evans, The New Evtradition Treaties oJ the United States, 59 ANI. J. INT'L L. 35 1,
352-53 (1965).
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incongruous when considering that a basic tenet of extradition is an
act of sovereignty based on an obligation of the character of pacta
sunt servanda. The argument remains one of state succession
obligations, and the United States maintains the position that these
treaties are binding, though it prefers negotiating new treaties if
and when possible with the said emerging nations.
I
EXTRADITION PROCEDURE IN THE UNITED STATES

International extradition in the United States is a national
power pertaining solely to the federal government and absolutely
denied to the several states.7 Moreover, the fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution has been construed to require an
applicable treaty or federal enactment before the federal
government may seize an alleged fugitive and surrender him to a
demanding nation.' The federal statute prescribing the procedure to
be followed in international extradition clearly requires that there
be a "treaty or convention . . . between the United States and any
foreign government" requesting surrender of the fugitive before
extradition will be allowedf
7. Valentine v. United States ev rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936). United States v,
Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886); IV G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL L&.w § 305
(1942). 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1964) states:
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United States
and any foreign government, any justice or judge of the United States, or any
commissioner authorized so to do by a court of the United States, or any judge of a
court of record of general jurisdiction of any State, may, upon complaint made under
oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction, with having committed within
the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the crimes provided for by
such treaty or convention, issue his warrant for the apprehension of the person so
charged, that he may be brought before such justice, judge, or commissioner, to the
end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and considered. If, on such hearing.
he deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the
proper treaty or convention, he shall certify the same, together with a copy of all the
testimony taken before him, to the Secretary of State, that a warrant may issue upon
the requisition of the proper authorities of such foreign government for the surrender
of such person, according to the stipulations of the treaty or convention: and he shall
issue his warrant for the commitment of the person so charged to the proper jail.
there to remain until such surrender shall be made.
8. I-actor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1964). U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
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The extradition procedure prescribed by this same federal
statute may be summarized briefly as follows. Extradition
proceedings must be initiated by the demanding nation's filing of a
verified complaint charging the fugitive with the commission of an
extraditable offense. The extradition magistrate, who may be a
federal or state judge or United States Commissioner, issues a
warrant for the fugitive's arrest and detention. The magistrate then
conducts a hearing in the fugitive's presence to determine whether
the demanding state has shown reasonable ground to believe the
fugitive has committed an extraditable offense. If the magistrate
deems the evidence sufficient, he orders the fugitive incarcerated
and certifies the evidence and transcripts of the hearing to the
Secretary of State. The Secretary of State may thereafter issue a
warrant of surrender upon requisition by the demanding nation. If
the prisoner has not been delivered up to the demanding nation
within two calendar months after the magistrate's commitment
order, the fugitive is entitled to be discharged from custody. 0
However, when the fugitive has instituted review of that order, the
two-month period commences from the time the fugitive's claims
are finally adjudicated."
When the United States is to be the demanding nation,
application for requisitions must be addressed to the Secretary of
State. If the alleged offense is within the jurisdiction of the state or
territorial courts, the application must come from the governor of
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby; any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
As Chief Justice John Marshall durably interpreted the treaty power:
A treaty is, in its nature, a contract between two nations, not a legislative act. It does
not generally effect, of itself, the object to be accomplished; especially so far as its
operation is infra-territorial; but is carried into execution by the sovereign power of
the respective parties to the instrument.
In the United States a different principle is established. Our Constitution declares a
treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in Courts of Justice
as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the
aid of any legislative provision.
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 195, 238-39 (1829).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 3188 (1964); .see In re Normano, 7 I-. Supp. 329 (D. Mass. 1934); In
re Dawson, 101 F. 253 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1900).
II. Jiminez v. Aristeguieta. 311 -.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914
(1963).
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such a state or territory; if the offense is against the laws of the
United States, the request should come from the Attorney General
of the United States. The application must state that the fugitive is
guilty of one of the offenses specified in the extradition treaty, and
also that the person sought has been found in the asylum country
or is believed to have sought asylum therein. The Secretary of State
then acts upon such applications in his discretion. One author
12
summarized the American procedure very aptly as follows:

A classic case that illustrates the substantive and procedural
limitations is that of Jimenez v. U.S. District Court. Procedurally,
in the United States, the surrender of an alleged fugitive to a foreign
Government is dependent upon the filing of an accusation charging
the offense specified in the treaty of extradition. It is not necessary
under the statute to require a requisition from a demanding
Government. Extradition, liberally constituted, a mixed question of
law and fact, is a proceeding within the "business of the courts" and
a complaint may be made by an authorized agent of the demanding
Government and need not be sworn to. The complaint should set
forth the knowledge of the complainant on which he makes the
complaint, the substance of the offense (not barred by the statute of
limitations in the requisitioned country), and, where the proceeding
is before a Commissioner, the special authority of such
commissioner to act. But in a general scnse refinements of pleading
are not adhered to. The record of proceedings before the foreign
court need not be attached to the complaint if they are in the
custody of the one making the complaint and the commissioner or
judge is possessed of the information which they contain, although it
is advisable that certified copies of the foreign complaint and
warrant be attached to and made a part of the local complaint and
presented to the statutory officer of the court of the United States,
or to any judge of a court of record of general jurisdiction of any
state. A complaint sworn to upon information and belief is held to
be sufficient. Provisional arrest and detention underlies-the spirit of
all extradition treaties of the United States with other nations and
the right to bail is sparingly recognized. The entire hearing is
governed by a showing of probable cause to believe that the alleged
fugitive had committed the extraditable offense, charged and within
the treaty particulars, and the evidence in the extradition proceedings
12.

Kutner, World Habeas Corpus and International Extradition, in INTERNATIONAL
246, 249-50 (1964) (footnote added).
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need not be sufficient to convict or pass on technical rules governing
admissibility in a criminal trial. In the event a second extradition
proceeding is instituted after the discharge of the fugitive on the
ground of insufficiency of the evidence, the second arrest and
examination are proper. Res judicata and autrefois acquit3 do not
apply. A review of an extradition order directing the Secretary of
State to execute the order of deportation may be tested by an
"appeal" 6y habeas corpus. State appeals are not proper. Habeas
corpus will not lie to review the magistrates issuance of warrant of
arrest in extradition proceeding if magistrate had jurisdiction,
offense charged was within the treaty. with the demanding state, and
there was evidence warranting finding of reasonable ground to believe
accused guilty.
Alleged error in the reception or rejection of evidence cannot be
considered. In the event the alleged fugitive is discharged on habeas
corpus, an appeal may be properly prosecuted by the Consul on
behalf of his demanding Government.
Here again, if the identity of the prisoner has been established and
probable cause has been shown extradition will be ordered. The final
delivery of an accused rests with the Secretary of State, who is not
obliged to order the delivery of the committed person to a
representative of a foreign Government, it being permissible for him
to review the evidence before, and the opinion of, the committing
magistrate and decide whether a case is one calling for surrender.
III
BASIC TREATY PROVISIONS
Several basic provisions may be found in most general treaties
of extradition. Some of these provisions reflect the prevailing
attitude toward the concept of national sovereignty, while other
provisions are designed to safeguard the fugitive's fundamental
rights and the integrity of the process.
.4.

TerritorialJurisdiction

The first of such provisions is some form of embodiment of
the principle of territoriality upon which the jurisdiction of the
requesting state and of the asylum state is based. The treaty
offenses provided for in the treaty must have been committed
13.

But see pp. 74345 & notes 27-30 injra.
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within the territorial jurisdiction of the requesting state, and the
fugitive must be found within the territorial jurisdiction of the
asylum state. The latest treaties, through application of this
concept, define territorial jurisdiction as including territorial waters
and the airspace belonging to or under control of one of the
contracting states, and vessels and aircraft belonging to one of the
contracting states or to a citizen or corporation thereof when such
a vessel is on the high seas or such aircraft is over the high seas."
The problems which may arise out of the principle of
territoriality and the definition of territorial jurisdiction is
illustrated by the Holohan murder case.", In September 1944,
Major William V. Holohan, a member of the top-secret wartime
Office of Strategic Service, was dropped behind enemy lines in
Northern Italy, along with Sergeant Lo Dolce, in order to assist
Italian partisans in Northern Italy. On December 6, 1944, Holohan
disappeared, and his companions reported that he had been slain by
a German patrol. Several years later, two Italian partisans who had
fought with Holohan and Lo Dolce came forward with a new story.
They said that Holohan had in fact been murdered by Lo Dolce
and his body dumped into Lake Orat. Holohan's body was
recovered almost perfectly preserved, and an autopsy confirmed this
second version of Holohan's death.
Despite the seriousness of the crime, no American court had
jurisdiction to try the case. No court martial had jurisdiction over
the murder because the would-be defendant was not a member of
the armed forces. Since criminal jurisdiction in the United States is
based upon the concept of territoriality, no criminal court in the
United States could take jurisdiction, since the crime was
committed in a foreign country. One of the most important issues,
then, was whether an Italian court could exercise jurisdiction over
the case, since the crime occurred in Northern Italy.
The court defined jurisdiction to mean "dominion and
control," and held that the fact that the area had been occupied by
14. Convention on Extradition with Israel, Dec. 10, 1962, art. IV. [1963] 2 U.S.T.
1707, T.I.A.S. No. 5476 (effective Dec. 5, 1963): Convention on Extradition with Sweden,
Oct. 24, 1961, art. IV, [1963] 2 U.S.T. 1845, T.I.A.S. No. 5496 (effective Dec. 3, 1963).
Treaty of Extradition with Brazil, Jan. 13, 1961, art. IV, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 2093. T.I.A.S. No.
5691 (effective Dec. 17, 1964). See also INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 48-128 (G. Mueller
E. Wise ed. 1965).
15. In re Lo Dolce, 106 F. Supp. 455 (W.D.N.Y. 1952).
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German troops preempted the Italian government's jurisdiction.
The decision thus made jurisdiction dependent upon actual physical
control of territory rather than the generally accepted international
law meaning which gives deference to the notion of sovereignty.
The principle of territorial jurisdiction shows glaring
weaknesses. Despite the fact that the United States has numerous
extradition treaties which allow the extradition of its own nationals,
and also status of American forces treaties with countries wherein
troops are garrisoned, the door is still open for criminals to evade
punishment. The theory of criminal jurisdiction attaching to the
person of the offender wherever he might be is not prevailing.
However, offenses committed outside the United States which have
or may have an effect inside the United States' territory are
prosecutable in the United States, notwithstanding the fact that
they were physically committed outside the territorial jurisdiction.
This is demonstrated in cases of income tax violations, crimes of
conspiracy wherein the crime is to be committed in the United
States, and other violations of certain foreign trade laws (anti-trust,
export controls, etc.).'"
B.

Double Criminality and "Fairness"

The second common provision worthy of note is the
requirement of double criminality. Extradition is not authorized
unless the fugitive is alleged to have committed one of the offenses
enumerated in the applicable extradition treaty. As to those treaties
which do not define these offenses, some body of substantive
criminal law must be applied by the extradition magistrate to
determine whether the act committed constitutes a treaty offense.
The substantive law applied is that of the state where the fugitive is
found. 17 The federal courts uphold the doctrine of double
16. For the extraterritorial effect of tax laws see Wurzel, Foreign Investment and
Extraterritorial Taxation, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1938). For conspiracies engaged in
outside the state see Poliafico v. United States, 237 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1956); United States v.
Steinberg. 62 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 729 (1933); United States ex rel.
De Moss v. Pennsylvania, 198 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Commonwealth v. Thomas,
410 Pa. 160, 189 A.2d 255 (1962). For trade violations and foreign trade negotiations see
Bassiouni & Landau. Presidential Discretion in Foreign Trade and Its Effect on East- West
Trade, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 494 (1968); Bassiouni & Landau, United States Public Fund
Sourc'es for InternationalInvestment and Trade. 17 DE PAUL L. REV. 77 (1967).
17. Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 61 (1903).
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criminality as a condition to extradition. In that respect, the
conduct complained of must be criminal according to the laws of
both the requesting and the asylum nations in order for the offenses
to be extraditable."8 Some American extradition treaties contain a
general provision explicitly embodying the requirement of double
criminality; 9 others are completely silent concerning the substantive
law to be applied.2 1 Most treaties," however, specifically require
double criminality only with regard to certain offenses, usually
financial crimes.22 Interpreting such a treaty, the Supreme Court, in
Wright v. Henkel,2 3 held that when the offense charged is expressly
required to be made criminal in both countries, the law of the state
where the fugitive is found will be applied. Broad language in the
opinion indicated that the principle of double criminality would be
applicable even absent explicit provision. In Factor v.
Laubenheinier,21 however, the Court, applying the mode of analysis
denoted by the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
concluded that when the particular offense charged is not among
those required to be criminal in both countries, the act complained
of need not constitute a crime in the state where the accused is
found. The Court permitted extradition for the offense of receiving
money knowing such to have been fraudulently obtained, although
the offense was not criminal under the laws of Illinois, where the
extraditee was found. It was sufficient, the Court stated, that the
offense was specified in the treaty and considered "by the
jurisprudence of both countries" a criminal act.
18. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1922); Kelly v. Griffin, 241 U.S. 6 (1916); Wright
v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40 (1903).
19. E-g., Treaty of Extradition with South Africa, Dec. 18, 1947, art. 5, [1951] I
U.S.T. 884, T.I.A.S. No. 2243; Treaty with Switzerland for the Extradition of Criminals,
May 14, 1900, arts. I & II, 31 Stat. 1928 (1901), T.S. No. 354.
20. L.g., Convention with Colombia for the Extradition of Criminals, May 7, 1888, 26
Stat. 1534 (1891), T.S. No. 58; Treaty with Ecuador Relative to Extradition, June 28, 1872,
18 Stat. 199 (1873). T.S. No. 79.
21. Approximately 64 out of 70 treaties fall into this category.
22. ELg., Extradition Treaty with Albania, Mar. I, 1933, art. I1, para. 22, 49 Stat.
3313 (1935), T.S No. 902; Extradition Treaty with Great Britain, Dec. 22, 1931. art. 3. 47
Stat. 2122 (1933), T.S. No. 849; Treaty with Austria on Extradition. Aug. 8. 1930, art. II,
46 Stat. 2779 (1930), T.S. No. 822.
23. 190 U.S.40 (1903).
24. 290 U.S. 276 (1933); Hudson, The Factor Case and Double Crinzinality1 il
l:Atradition, 28 At. J. INr't L. 274 (1934).
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The criminal nature of the extraditee's conduct does not have
to conform to a specified offense, nor does the offense have to
contain the same legal elements. What is required is that the nature
of the conduct be deemed criminal in substance. Thus, while the
requirement of double criminality is in concreto criminality in both
states, it should be sufficient that it be in abstracto in the asylum
state. It must be noted, however, that no reasoning by analogy can
be used to find a given conduct criminal when otherwise it does not
constitute in its broad substantive meaning a crime in the United
States. This is a requirement imposed by the maxim nullum crimen
sine lege which, as an element of notice, is a constitutional
requirement for the legality of the offense.
It must be noted also that, in the case of treaties clearly listing
extraditable offenses, the United States has treated such listing as
exclusive and not illustrative. To that extent, the American practice
requires in concreto criminality in the requesting and asylum states.
The doctrine of double criminality furthers the objective of
protecting the individual's substantive rights. National laws may
vary regarding certain conduct, and it seems justifiable to refuse
extradition for conduct which is lawful in the asylum state though
criminal within the demanding nation. Such protection has
continued to be afforded the individual despite the Laubenheimner
case. In practice, lower federal courts have continued to apply the
criminal law of the state where the fugitive is found.26 Further,
recent extradition treaties contain general provisions requiring the
conduct complained of to be punishable in both countries by a term
of one year or more." This is deemed to be commendable, since
25. M. Bassiouni. Cases and Materials on Criminal Law 32-34, 2d ed. 1963
(unpublished course materials for use at De Paul College of Law). Q. Lewis v.
Commonwealth. 184 Va. 69, 34 S.E.2d 389 (1945). Justice Holmes, in Roschen v. Ward, 279
U.S. 337, 339 (1929) (emphasis added), stated: "We agree to all the generalities about not
supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no canon against using common
sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." The meaning in double
criminality rests in the purposes of prosecuting and punishing an offender who has some
element of notice that his conduct is prohibited. It is not in the sense of allowing him to evade
extradition on mere technicalities wherein he was otherwise granted a fair process. The
acceptance of the maxim awt dedere aut punire will obviously have great bearing on the
concept of double criminality.
26. United States ex rel. Rauch v. Stockinger, 269 F.2d 681 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 913 (1959) (same treaty and offense as in Factor; New York panel law applied);
Villareal v. Hammond. 74 1.2d 503. 505-06 (5th Cir. 1934).
27. Convention on Extradition with Sweden, Oct. 24, 1961, art. ii, [1963] 2 U.S.T.
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such provisions uphold the privilege of asylum for individuals
charged with trivial offenses technically falling within the treaty's
list of extraditable offenses.
A problem arises in cases wherein the penal action is
extinguished or the punishability of the actor is forgiven by the
state in which the offense took place. The manifestation of such
cases is expressed by the application of: statute of limitations,
pardon, grace, prescription, or any other form in which the penal
action is extinguished or criminal liability forsaken. Seldom do the
laws of the requesting and asylum states coincide, and, therefore,
the issue is which one applies. Most of the causes which end
criminal prosecution or punishability in the United States are in the
nature of affirmative defenses to be raised by objection of the
defendant. Seldom does it constitute a condition of nullity. In all
events, it is recognized as a question of public or criminal policy
which inherently emanates from the sovereignty of the state. In
addition, it is regarded in extradition matters as a question of
"fairness," and, therefore, the prevailing view is that the law of the
requesting state applies, unless it so violates the sense of fairness of
the asylum state that the latter will assert its own law. The
rationale being that the asylum state is using its power to surrender
the accused and, therefore, the terms and conditions for the use of
such power must not offend its own policy. In the case of a federal
government, the laws of the state wherein the accused is found are
to be applied to determine the question of double criminality unless
the treaty stipulates otherwise.
In furtherance of the fairness concept of double criminality,
one must also recognize the maxim non bis in idem. Essentially, it
is a condition which emanates from the belief that a person should
only suffer once the consequences of his crime. Engrained in
natural law and canon law, it finds its expression (as a principle) in
every code of justice. It is guaranteed by the fifth amendment
prohibition against "double jeopardy," which so far applies only
to federal courts.2 All states have a similar provision, but different
standards prevail. While the federal courts, for example, hold that
1845, T.I.A.S. No. 5496 (effective Dec. 3, 1963); Treaty of Extradition with Brazil, Jan. 13,
1961, art. 111, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 2093, T.I.A.S. No. 5691 (effective Dec. 17, 1964).
28. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF, AMERICA, ANALYSIS AND
INTERPRETATION 1274 (N. Small & L. Jason ed. 1964).
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"substantially identical" offenses shall not be prosecuted twice,
many states hold that the "identical" offense shall not be
prosecuted twice. Multiple offenses arising out of the commission
of the same act may also be tried separately and consecutively in
some states,29 while they cannot be in others. But of greater
significance is the doctrine of "separate sovereignties" applied in
the United States ° This doctrine allows both the state government
and the federal government to prosecute and punish separately and
consecutively for the same offense; thus, in effect, placing the
individual twice in jeopardy of his life and liberty, because each
prosecution is allegedly an offense committed against a different
sovereign. Hence, it is not a one-act, one-punishment approach, but
one offense, one punishment. This raises problems at the
extradition level because of the accepted defense of non bis in idem
as a general affirmative defense against subsequent prosecutions by
the same sovereign. But where the offense is also an extraditable
crime against another sovereign, the United States could not refuse
extradition on the grounds of double jeopardy because of its
separate sovereignty doctrine. However, the viability of the separate
sovereignty doctrine is perhaps questionable. In a recent Supreme
Court case,3' where a majority of the Court refused to reach the
constitutional issue, four members expressly indicated that the fifth
amendment double jeopardy provision should be incorporated in
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Although the
cause dealt with double prosecutions solely on the state level,
reliance by the concurring and dissenting justices for their
constitutional interpretation was placed on the dissenting opinion of
Justice Black in Bartkus. Thus, if double jeopardy finally becomes
a question of "fundamental fairness," such a development will then
mean that the United States courts will deny extradition whenever
it is for an offense for which the accused has already been placed in
jeopardy in the sense of the principle of non bis in idem as applied
by the American courts.

29. E.g., Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958).
30. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); see also Fisher, Double Jeopardy. Two
Sovereignties and the Intruding Constitution, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1961); Frandk, An
International Lawyer Looks at the Bartkus Rule, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1096 (1959).
31. Cichos v. Indiana, 385 U.S. 76, 80-82 (1966).
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The Political Offense Exception

This exception, which appears in all American extradition
treaties now in force, expressly prohibits the surrender of persons
charged with "any crime or offense of a political character." 32
Some treaties also prohibit surrender for "acts connected with such
crimes or offenses." '33 The reasons for the political offense
exception ultimately rest upon the asylum state's sense of humane
treatment. It is generally acknowledged that political crimes affect
the demanding state's most sensitive desires for peace and security,
and, therefore, inspire a passionately hostile atmosphere which
makes an orderly and fair trial impossible.Y Asylum states also feel
that political offenses, unlike ordinary crimes, reflect the
individual's resistance to the regime of the demanding state alone
so that the presence of the offender in the asylum state is not a
threat to its domestic tranquility 5
The commendable objectives of the political offense exception
have unfortunately not been realized. The reason for this lies in the
fact that in every case the definition of political offenses and
determination of whether the crimes charged constitute political
offenses lie within the authority of the asylum state, and the courts
of such states have experienced difficulty in arriving at a workable
definition of what constitutes a political offense.
As a guiding principle, the courts usually begin with the generally
accepted view that, broadly speaking, a political offense is an act
directed against the State. Thus, such offenses as treason, sedition,
and espionage are generally regarded as political-for which
extradition is denied. In terms of the traditional law, these offenses
are "purely political offenses" or objective offenses, since they have
no element whatever of an ordinary crimel

32. Note, Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1313, 1322 (1962).
33. Id. at 1322 nn.70 & 71.
34. See Garcia-Mora, Treason, Sedition and Espionage as Political Offenses Under the
Law of Extradition, 26 U. PTT. L. REV. 65, 85 (1964). See also Evans, Reflections Upon the
PoliticalOffense in InternationalPractice,57 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1963).
35. Garcia-Mora, supra note 34. See also Evans, The Political Refugee in the United
States Immigration Law and Practice,3 I1r'L LAW. 204 (1969).
36. Garcia-Mora, Crimes Against Humanity and the Principle oJ Nonextradition ol
Political Offenders, 62 MICH. L. REV. 927, 942 (1964).
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"Relative political offenses," on the other hand, are offenses
wherein. "a common crime is so inextricably linked with a political
act that the entire offense is regarded as political and, hence,
nonextraditable. ' 37 The United States courts basically adhere to the
3
British position, enunciated in In re Castioni,
1 that relative
political offenses will not be extraditable when two conditions are
met: there must be a political revolt or disturbance; and the act for
which extradition is requested must be incidental to, or form part
of, the political disturbance. However, the so-called "political
incidence test" has been broadened in America so as to include as
a political offense any act connected, no matter how tenuously, to
political turmoil. In the famous Rudewitz case of 1908, dealing
with a Russian revolutionary charged by the Tsarist government
with the common crimes of murder and arson, the Secretary of
State overruled the magistrate's decision and concluded that
Rudewitz's crimes were political offenses committed as part of the
revoluntionary activity of the Social Democratic Labor Party, and
refused to issue the warrant of surrender.3 9 It is felt that the
"incidence test" is unusually broad, since such test may be satisfied
by any terrorist, assassin, or guerrilla whose criminal acts remotely
serve political ends."
The State Department, in an effort to avoid the many
difficulties with the political offense exception, has drafted the
exception with considerable care in the recent treaties with Brazil
and Sweden. The Brazilian treaty exempts from the prohibition,
"criminal acts" which constitute clear manifestations of anarchism
or envisage the overthrow of the bases of all political organizations
in order to eliminate asylum for such offenders! 1 The treaty also
permits extradition for offenses having political overtones, subject
to the condition that the extraditee will not be more severely
punished because of the political ramifications of the offense.4 2 The
Swedish treaty also adds that the surrender of a fugitive may be
37. Id.
38. [1891] I Q.B. 149 (C.A. 1890).
39. Note from Secretary of State Root to the Russian Ambassador Rosen discussed in
I'N.G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 316, at 49-50 (1942).
40. IV G. HACKWORTH, supra note 39, at 50-52.
41. Treaty of Extradition with Brazil, Jan. 13, 1961, art. V, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 2093,
T.I.A.S. No. 5691 (effective Dec. 17, 1964).

42.

Id.
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denied for humane reasons, such as the "youth or health of the
persons sought. ....".
The establishment of a dividing line between passive political
crimes and actual common crimes in furtherance of a political
objective is probably the closest one can achieve in providing a
more objective criterion. In this respect, however, one should
exclude war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the serious
offenses in the sense of the Geneva agreements. But even then, the
decisive consideration seems to be the extent to which one state is
interested in the preservation of the social and political order of the
other state. The value judgment rendered by the asylum state on the
nature of the crime of the accused and on its proportionality to the
alleged political objectives is a relationship and evaluation impossible
to define in the present conditions of world relations. But as one
author refers to it: "When extradition fails, is abduction the solution?'" Political offenses are not the only offenses presenting a
problem of definition and value judgment; so do fiscal and economic
crimes when they affect the economic structure of a state. The importance of those offenses in the communist and socialist countries is
joined in by the emerging nations whose economies cannot sustain any
violations. In those cases again, the determining factor will reside in
the affinity of the political, social, and economic order of the respective states. Normally, the treaty will contemplate those questions and
provide individual solutions more apt to reflect this consideration.
D.

The Doctrine of Specialty

The doctrine of speciality is also common in American extradition treaties and practice. This doctrine imposes the limitation
that demanding nations cannot prosecute the extraditee for any
offense other than that for which the accused was surrendered.
Even where the treaty fails to expressly state this reservation, the
Supreme Court has indicated that the doctrine may be implied
43. Convention on Extradition with Sweden, Oct. 24, 1961, art. V, (1963] 2 U.S.T.
1845, T.I.A.S. No. 5496 (effective Dec. 3, 1963).
44. Cardozo, When Extradition Fails. Is Abduction the Solution?, 55 ANi. J. INT'L L.
127 (1961), discussing the problems in extraditing Artukovic and the invitation to use the
same means as were employed in the Eichmann case. See also the Tshombe case and, in this
respect, the World Habeas Corpus Petition submitted on his behalf to the United Nations
Human Rights Commission on July 27, 1967. N.Y. Times, July 28, 1967, at 64, col. I.
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from the "manifest scope and object of the treaty." 45 The doctrine
is also a principle of international law that would be applicable in
the absence of express treaty provisions to the contrary.4 6
Certain narrow exceptions to the doctrine of specialty have
been recognized. The extraditee may be prosecuted for offenses
committed subsequent to extradition, 7 or for offenses committed
prior to extradition providing the demanding nation has given the
accused a reasonable opportunity to depart from the country. The
doctrine of specialty has also been construed to prevent
reextradition of the accused from the United States to a third
' 48
nation until the accused has been offered his "right of return.
The doctrine of specialty rests on the premise that the asylum
state has an absolute right to grant asylum, and that such state
surrenders the accused for the special purpose defined in the treaty,
and that the authorities of the demanding nation lack jurisdiction
of the accused for all other purposes. Obviously, the right of asylum
under international law would be grossly subverted if the
demanding nation were permitted to prosecute the accused for any
charge it deemed sufficient.
Consider also the connection between political and economic
offenses and the doctrine of specialty which would insure against
faked extraditions for a common crime wherein the object is
political.
E.

Extradition of Nationals

The final treaty provision which will be examined is that
dealing with nationals. American extradition treaties contain three
types of such provisions. The first does not refer to nationals
specifically, but agrees to the extradition of "all persons." 49 As
both judicial construction' and executive interpretation5 1 have
45. Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 317 (1907).
46. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
47. See, e.g., Collins v. O'Neill, 214 U.S. 113 (1909).
48. United States ex rel. Donnelly v. Mulligan, 74 F.2d 220, 223 (2d Cir. 1934).
49. E.g., Extradition Treaty with Great Britain, Dec. 22, 1931, art. 1, 47 Stat. 2122
(1933), T.S. No. 849; Convention with Italy for the Surrender of Criminals, Mar. 23, 1868,
art. I, 15 Stat. 629 (1869), T.S. No. 174. See also Note, supra note 32, at 1321-22.
50. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 457 (1913).
5i. Id. at 473-76 (quoting from memo of Secretary of State Knox).
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consistently held that "persons" include nationals, a refusal to
surrender for the reason that the fugitive is a national cannot be
justified under such a treaty. The second and most common type of
treaty provides that "neither of the contracting parties shall be
bound to deliver up its own citizens or subjects under the
stipulations of this convention. ' 5 2 Treaties of this sort are the most
numerous due to the insistence of other nations-the policy of the
United States in treaty negotiations has been, when possible, to
provide for the surrender of nationals.5 3 As construed, such a
provision prohibits the Secretary of State from surrendering a
citizen of the United States. 4 The third type provides that "neither
of the contracting parties shall be bound to deliver up its own
citizens under the stipulations of this convention, but the executive
authority of each shall have the power to deliver them up if, in its
discretion, it be deemed proper to do so." 5 Exercise of the
statutory discretion would be consistent with the treaty obligation,
and the Secretary has both granted and denied surrender of
American nationals under a treaty of this type. In 1947 and 1949,
the State Department refused to surrender a total of four American
citizens to Mexico. In notes to the Mexcian Ambassador, the
Department invited the attention of the Mexican government to the
persistent refusal of Mexico to surrender its nationals. However,
despite a similar refusal of the requesting country to surrender its
own nationals, the State Department, in a case involving a treaty
providing for the extradition of "all persons," considered itself
obligated to surrender a United States national. 6
IV
THE SCOPE OF HABEAS CORPUS AND THE RULE OF NON-INQUIRY

The fugitive's judicial remedies to secure review of the
52. E.g., Extradition Treaty with Iraq, June 7, 1934, art. Vil, 49 Stat. 3380 (1936),
T.S. No. 907; Extradition Treaty with Venezuela, Jan. 19, 1922, art. ViII, 43 Stat. 1698
(1925), T.S. No. 675; Extradition Treaty with France, Jan. 6, 1909, art. V, 37 Stat. 1526
(1913), T.S. No. 561.
53. See IV G. HACKWORTH, supra note 39, § 318, at 55.
54. Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 18 (1936).
55. ELg., Cqnvention for Extradition with Argentine Republic, Sept. 26, 1896, art. Ill,
31 Stat. 1883 (1901), T.S. No. 6; Extradition Treaty with Mexico, Feb. 22, 1889, art. IV, T.S.
No. 242; Extradition Treaty with Japan, Apr. 29, 1886, art. VIl, 24 Stat. 1015 (1887), T.S.
No. 191.
56. See Note, supra note 32, at 1322 nn.68 & 69.
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magistrate's order to commitment are extremely limited. No direct
appeal lies from such order. 7 The incarcerated fugitive has only
two courses of action: he may either petition the federal courts for
writs of habeas corpus" or petition such courts for certiorari 9 to
challenge the legality of his detention. The scope of review is the
same in both proceedings.6
In international extradition cases, the Supreme Court has
narrowly restricted the function of the habeas corpus proceeding.
The writ cannot serve as an appellate review to rehear what the
magistrate has previously considered. In Fernandez v. Phillips," the
Court stated:
The alleged fugitive from justice has had his hearing and habeas
corpus is available only to inquire whether the magistrate had
jurisdiction, whether the offense charged is within the treaty and, by
a somewhat liberal extension, whether there was any evidence
warranting the finding that there was reasonable ground to believe
the accused guilty.
Further, the federal courts have been unconcerned with the
fairness of the fugitive's trial and treatment subsequent to the
extradition. On a habeas corpus hearing the subject of the review
involves only the extradition proceeding itself and not the
prospective conduct of the demanding state's authorities toward the
accused.
In Neely v. Henkel,6 2 the fugitive Neely contended that
amendments to the federal extradition laws were unconstitutional in
that the accused was not assured the rights, privileges, and
immunities guaranteed by the United States Constitution upon
surrender to the demanding nation. The protections specifically
alluded to by Neely were constitutional prohibitions against bills of
attainder and ex post facto laws, and guarantees of writs of habeas
corpus, trial by jury, and the fundamental rights of life, liberty, and
property. In reply, the Supreme Court stated:
57.
58.
(1915).
59.
60.
61.
62.

Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364 (1920).
l-ernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311 (1925); Collins v. Johnston, 237 U.S. 502
Lincoln v. Power, 228 F. 70 (E.D.N.Y.), aJJ'd, 241 U.S. 651 (1915).

Id.
268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925).
180 U.S. 109, 122 (1901).
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[T]hese provisions have no relation to crimes committed without the
jurisdiction of the United States against the laws of a foreign
country.
In connection with the above proposition, we are reminded of the
fact that the appellant is a citizen of the United States. But such
citizenship does not . . . entitle him to demand, of right, a trial in

any other mode than that allowed to its own people by the country
whose laws he has violated and from whose justice he has fled 3
The rule that federal courts will not consider alleged oppressive
action by demanding states is known as the rule of non-inquiry.
This rule is brought into sharp focus in the line of cases dealing
with in absentia convictions of extraditees by the demanding
nation's tribunals, and that nation's subsequent attempts to
extradite the fugitive from the United States. In such cases, the
United States follows the general principle of international law that
the in absentia conviction is not conclusive of the individual's guilt,
but is treated merely as an indictment or formal charge against the
extraditee 4
6 5 involving
In the first such case, Ex parte Fudera,
the in
absentia conviction and sentencing of the fugitive for murder by the
Italian courts, the circuit court, on a writ of habeas corpus, chose
to pass over the question of the propriety of the in absentia
criminal prosecution. The court, instead, rejected the Italian
government's evidence of guilt as "pure hearsay" and released the
fugitive on the ground of insufficient evidence.
The next case, Ex parte La Mantia,6 similarly involved a
murder conviction by an Italian tribunal. This time the fugitive
alleged that the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
had been violated, since he had been denied the right of
confrontation. The federal district court held that this guarantee
did not apply to persons extradited for trial under treaties with
foreign countries whose laws may be entirely different." However,
the fugitive again was ordered released for insufficiency of evidence
presented by the Italian government.
63. Id. at 122-23.
64. Ex parte La Mantia, 206 F. 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1913); Ex parte Fudera, 162 F. 591
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908); In re Mylonas, 187 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Ala. 1960).
65. 162 F. 591, 592 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908).
66. 206 F. 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
67. Id. at 332.
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The district court in In re Mylonas, 8 consistent with prior
authority, ruled that Mylonas' conviction in absentia did not
preclude extradition, even though the fugitive, convicted of
embezzlement, had no knowledge of the charges or prosecution by
the Greek tribunal, was not representd by counsel, and had no one
appear for him 9 Again, however, the court found a ground upon
which it ordered the accused discharged from custody; namely, that
under Article V of the United States-Greek 1931 treaty of
extradition, the Greek Government's long-delayed effort to take the
accused into custody exempted Mylonas from extradition "from
lapse of time or other lawful cause.""
Thus, in these three cases, the courts, though recognizing the
limited scope of habeas corpus and the rule of non-inquiry, were
able to free the accused upon other grounds. The following cases,
however, presented no such opportunities to nullify the harsh
attitude toward the rights of the extraditees convicted in absentia.
The results were two court opinions which voiced disenchantment
with the established law.
In Argento v. Horn7 ' the Sixth Circuit unwillingly felt itself
constrained to submit to precedent. Argento, the fugitive, had been
convicted in absentia for the crime of murder by the Italian courts.
The murder had occurred in 1921, and the conviction obtained in
1931, but not until the 1950's did the Italian Government initiate
proceedings for Argento's extradition. The court stated:
The appellant has apparently been a law-abiding person during the
thirty years that he has been in this country. To enter a judgment
that will result in sending him back to life imprisonment in Italy,
upon the basis of the record before the Commissioner, does not sit
easily with the members of a United States court, sensible of the
great Constitutional immunities. . . .[H]owever, we conceive it our
obligation to do soZ
73 was decided by the Second Circuit Court of
Gallina v. Fraser
68.
69.
70.

187 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Ala. 1960).
Id. at 719.
Extradition Treaty with Greece, May 6, 1931, art V, 47 Stat. 2185 (1933), T.S.

No. 855.
71. 241 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1957).
72. Id. at 263-64.
73. 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1960). See also Note, Foreign Trials in Absentia: Due
Process Objections to Unconditional Extradition, 13 STAN. L. REV. 370 (1961).
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Appeals, which also bowed to precedent, but indicated that given a
proper case, the rule of non-inquiry might not be followed. In this
case Gallina had been tried and convicted in absentia by the Italian
courts for the crime of robbery. Gallina petitioned the federal
district court for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that if
extradited to Italy he would be imprisoned without retrial and
without an opportunity to face his accusers or conduct any defense.
The petition was denied and the court of appeals affirmed. Circuit
Judge Waterman stated:
[W]e have discovered no case authorizing a federal court, in a
habeas corpus proceeding challenging extradition from the United
States to a foreign nation, to inquire into the procedures which await
the relator upon extradition. . . . Nevertheless, we confess to some
disquiet at this result. We can imagine situations when the relator,
upon extradition, would be subject to procedures or punishment so
antipathetic to a federal court's sense of decency as to require
reexamination of the principle set out above.74
This was not such a case, however, because Gallina had been
represented by counsel at his trial, and was tried along with his
alleged associates who were present before the Italian court and
were also convicted.
The courts, therefore, have thus far refused to undertake the
factual inquiry into the individual's perspective treatment by the
demanding nation. There is hope, however, in view of Judge
Waterman's opinion, that in some future case the court might
refuse to surrender the fugitive to a foreign nation's oppressive or
arbitrary criminal processes.
The thesis of the United States to inquire into the fairness of
the proceedings or to impugn the criminal process of the requesting
state is indefensible on those grounds alone. It is unclear whether
this practice rests solely on the inquiry of "fairness" for the
accused in the requesting state or whether it is predicated on the
interpretation of the treaty obligation. However, another factor is
public policy based on the principle of comity." But since rules and
conditions of extradition should apply equally to nationals and
74. 278 F.2d at 78-79.
75. Kuhn, Extradition Jrol the United States oJ American Citizens Under Eisting
Treaties, 31 A,%i. J. INT'L L. 476, 479 (1937).
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nonnationals, it is understandable that a state and its courts seek to
preserve the very basic, fundamental principles of justice and
fairness which they view as indispensable to maintain the integrity
of their judicial process.

IV
EXECUTIVE DISCRETION IN EXTRADITION

Prior to 1871, the function of the Secretary of State upon
receiving the magistrate's certification was considered purely
ministerial. Once the Secretary had satisfied himself as to the
regularity of the proceedings before the magistrate, his duty was to
issue the warrant. Thus, in effect, the sole power to commit for
extradition or to discharge was vested in the extradition
magistrate. 7
Executive discretion was first exercised in 1871, when the
Secretary surrendered only four out of seven persons awaiting
extradition to Great Britain on charges of piracy and assault with
intent to commit murder. No reason for the refusal to surrender
77
the other three prisoners was given.
78
In the first judicial recognition of this discretion, In re Stupp,
Sectiorn 5270 of the Revised Statutes was construed to endow the
Secretary with power to refuse to surrender the accused. Stupp's
extradition to Prussia had been certified to the Secretary by the
magistrate, although Prussia's jurisdiction over the offense was not
territorial but was based on Stupp's Prussian nationality. The
Secretary refused to issue the warrant on advice of the Attorney
General that the extradition treaty applied only when the alleged
offense had occurred within the territory of the requesting country.
The extent of the Secretary's discretion is not clear, for both
the statute and the courts are silent as to direct limits imposed on
such discretion. Usually, the treaty obligation to extradite is
absolute. The extradition statute might be interpreted to grant the
Secretary broad discretion to refuse to surrender in a case included
within the treaty obligation. If so, although extradition treaties are
76.
77.
78.

I J. MOORIE. L-TRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION § 361 (1891).
Id. § 363.
23 F. Cas. 281 (No. 13,562) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1873); see IV G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST

Of INTFRNATIONAL LAW

§ 338 (1942).
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considered self-executing, the extradition statute, reenacted in 1948,
would supersede prior inconsistent treaty provisions under the rule
that treaties and statutes are legislation having coordinate
authority. 9 However, the statute should probably be interpreted to
grant the Secretary only limited discretion to differ from the courts
in the matter of treaty interpretation. In fact, the Secretary has
always based his refusal to surrender upon a determination that the
treaty did not require extradition in that instance. Thus, a
formulation of the limits of the Secretary's discretion can be
derived only indirectly from executive and judicial construction of
our treaty undertakings
Whatever such a theoretical formulation might be in practice,
the Secretary acts as an authority for de novo proceedings on the
precise issues previously resolved by the extradition magistrate, and
the Secretary apparently considers his discretion only coextensive
with the issues presentable at the extradition proceedings.
The United States extradition treaties generally provide that
the requesting state must present to the magistrate sufficient
evidence of the accused's guilt as would justify the apprehension
and commitment of the accused for trial according to the laws of
the asylum state. It is in this area that the Secretary's discretionary
refusal to surrender is most prominent. Although the extradition
magistrate determined that the evidence is sufficient, in several
cases the Secretary reached a contrary conclusion and refused to
extradite the accused person. Other instances of the Secretary's
exercise of discretion are the refusal to extradite United States
citizens to demanding states which have historically refused to
extradite their nationals at America's request, the refusal to
extradite for crimes deemed by the Secretary to have constituted
political offenses, and the deferment of extradition while the fugitive
was undergoing prosecution or was imprisoned within the United
States."
Despite its power of review, the executive (Secretary) has
refused surrender infrequently (only twice between 1940 and 1960),
79. See Note, supra note 32, at 1316; Harvard Research in International Law, Draft
Convention on Extradition, 29 Amt. J. INT'L L. 21 (Supp. 1935).
80. See Note, supra note 32, at 1319-21.
81.
1 J. MOORE, supra note 76, § 366; Note, supra note 32, at 1319-21.
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and only then when discretion to refuse surrender of nationals was
expressly granted by the treaty.82 Three reasons may be suggested
for this infrequent exercise of executive discretion. First, as the law
of extradition has become more highly developed, extradition
magistrates have been more effective in eliminating those cases that
do not give rise to an obligation to surrender. Second, the courts
examining such extradition proceedings on writs of habeas corpus
are asserting a greater supervisory role, despite their earlier
protestations to the contrary. Third, the State Department wishes
to defer to the requests of the other nations in an effort to maintain
good foreign relations.
Whatever the State Department's reasons might be for
refusing to make more frequent use of its discretionary powers,
critics feel that the Department's extradition policies are untenable,
and serve only to deny the cause of human rights and international
due process in the world community. The State Department is
constantly urged to be more active in securing human rights
through a more liberal use of its power to refuse extradition,
especially since the courts still adhere to the rule of non-inquiry and
provide only limited judicial review.
ft would seem, however, that since the power to refuse
surrender is discretionary in nature and, as such, subject to
arbitrary changes in executive policy as to its exercise or
nonexercise, adequate safeguards for the extraditee will come only
through judicial rejection, as "prophesied" by the court in Gallina
v. Fraser, of the rule of non-inquiry and a general widening of the
scope of judicial review in extradition cases.
VI
EXTRADITION AND THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCESS

The question of extradition by its very definition crosses over
several fields of law. Commencing with international law, it affects
human rights and is exercised via the judiciary and executive
branches of the American government, inevitably touching upon
constitutional grounds relating to the powers of the executive,
specifically the President insofar as treaties, executive discretion, or
82.
83.

Note, supra note 32, at 1328.
278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1960).
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international cooperation is concerned.- 1 However, by its subjection
to a judicial determination, extradition entails questions which go
to the very essence of the American criminal process and its
outlook to the relationship of the rights of individuals and the
inherently coercive powers of the state.s4
The reader must first assume an understanding of the
American accusatorial process wherein the individual enjoys the
presumption of innocence 5 and is, without distinctions, entitled to
the "'due process of law" concept provided by the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution."6 The concept of
such a process presupposes that society (the state) and the
individual are in a confrontation of opposing and conflicting
rights.87 Thus, the choice of constitutional protections is provided to
ensure certain minimal standards of "fairness" or "fair play"
designed to afford "substantial justice" and to maintain a "scheme
of ordered liberty" via a rule of law: due process of law." ' Any
process-and notably a coercive and criminal process-must abide
by norms of "decency" and be executed through means which do
not "offend the sense of decency of a civilized society."" Because
of its nature, extradition touches the individual and affects his
"life, liberty, or property without due process of law." 0
It must be universally understood by jurists who are not
familiar with the American legal system that "no person" within
the jurisdiction of the United States can be substracted this
83.1. For an analogous argument see Bassiouni, The War Power and the Law of War:
TheorY and Realism, 18 DEPAUL L. REV. 188 (1968).
84. See THi-. CONSTITUTION OP TlE: UNITH) STATES Ot AMI-RICA. ANALYSIS AN)
INTI-RPRI.-rATION 997-1010 (N. Small & L. Jason ed. 1964).
85. M. Bassiouni, %upra note 25, at 160-63.
86. See note 90 infra.
87. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Escobedo v. Illinois. 378 U.S, 478
(1964): Malloy v. Hogan. 378 U.S. I (1964); and, on the implications of Malloy, Bassiouni,
Recent Supreme Court Decisio. Sirengthen lllinois Lait E~nlorcement. 2 ILL. CONTINLING
LI-GAI I DuCC. No. 4, at I1 (1964). See abo Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937);
Twinning v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908): Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
88. L,.g.. I-airman. Does the fourteenth .Imendnentt Incorporate the Bill of Right'
Ihe Original L nder.standing. 2 STAN. L. Ri-v. 5 (1949); Kadish, Methodology and ( riterta
/i I)el Proce% Idjudicaition I .Sur ci and (ruiti .n.66 Y, II L.J. 319 (1957).
89. See. e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46 (1947); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
9
0. See Tin. CONSTITLTION Of- Till UNITI-D STAThS. supra note 84. at 1082-1177. for
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guarantee, regardless of the foreign and international aspects of
extradition. The appreciation of these basic considerations will offer
the reader the conceptual basis for the requirements of "probable
cause"'" at the judicial instance granting extradition and also the
purpose and scope of the habeas corpus summary remedy.
In the Continental European legal thinking, the basic
assumption is that all states have an interest in mutual assistance
to suppress criminality-even though not necessarily reciprocal.
Unfortunately, the failing of that assumption lies in its very
premise. States are seldom interested in suppressing criminality as
defined in other states, and seldom do they have any concern for
the maintenance of the political and economic structures of another
state. Any possible interest becomes a reality when there is
mutuality or reciprocity, and thus states are motivated by selfish
reasons and not globally altruistic concepts.
Such concern for the welfare of another state becomes reality
when the legal and political systems of the respectively interested
states have reached a level of affinity or are interrelated through
extraneous circumstances generally pertaining to the real politic.
Neither of these emanates from the higher concern of a world
community sharing a common interest in the protection against
criminal threats directed against its societies.
Thus, witness the many impediments to extradition which
often take the cover of conditions of "reciprocity," "double
criminality," exclusion of "political crimes," and even some
common crimes deriving therefrom. As the practice pursues its
course, the hurdles increase, giving rise to the many practical
devices used to circumvent precisely that which was sought to be
protected. Among these is "disguised extradition" which takes the
form of expulsion, deportation, subterfuge to which immigration
regulations may lend themselves, and even kidnapping as in the
92
Elchmann and Tshombe cases.

an extension of the due process concept as an all-encompassing concept of fairness and
justice whenever a deprivation of liberty occurs. For its extension to any deprivation of liberty
see Bassiouni, The Right of the Mentally IIIto Cure and Treatment: 4fedical Due Process,

15 DEPAUL L. REv. 291 (1966).
91.

92.

See notes 28 & 84supra.Seealso pp. 716 & 717supra.
O'Higgins, Disguised Extradition: The Soblen Case, 27 MOD.

L.

REV. 521

(1964).
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Problems of a narrowly construed sovereignty are nonetheless
to be reckoned with. Procedural mechanics and limitations of
jurisdictional concepts are but some examples which, when
examined in the context of questions of double jeopardy,
prescription, amnesty, grace, pardon, extinction of the penal action,
and statute of limitations, are only some of the issues confronting
those in search for speedier procedure ensuring societies against the
criminal element without sacrificing the rights of individuals.
VII
CONCLUSION

The ideal solution is, of course, to elevate extradition from the
national or parochial plane to the international or universal level.
This would first cause us to examine "criminality" in a world-wide
sense rather than a provincial one. A criminal would be extradited
not because "double criminality" or "reciprocity" was satisfied,
but because aut dedere aut punire. It would place extradition at a
level where basic human rights-enunciated by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and other international treaties-will
find their real and practical expression.
One of the tools should be World Habeas Corpus93 which, at
the local level in the common law countries, has proven so effective
and yet so uncumbersome to the aims of criminal justice. These farreaching propositions will be considered by the 1969 Rome
Congress in the terms covered by a proposed resolution introduced
See also Evans, Acquisition of Custody Over the InternationalFugitive OJJender-A1ternatives to Extradition:A Survey of United States Practice,40 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 77 (1964).
93. See generally L. KUTNER, WORLD HABEAS CORPUS (1962); Kutner, World Habeas
Corpus. Human Rights and World Community. 17 DE PAUL L. REV. 3 (1967): Kutner.
"International" Due Process Jbr Prisoners oJ War: The Need or a Special Tribunal oJ
World Habeas Corpus, 21 U. MIAMI L. REV. 721 (1967); Kutner, World Habeas Corpus:
The Legal Ultimate Jbr the Unity of Mankind, 40 NOTRE DAME LAW. 570 (1965): Kutner,
World Habeas Corpus: Legal Ligament Jbr Political Diversitr, 43 U. DET. L.J. 79 (1965);
Kutner, World Habeas Corpus and International Extradition, 41 U. DET. L.J. 525 (1964);
Kutner, World Habeas Corpus: A Legal Absolute Jor Survival, 39 U.DET. L.J. 279 (1962);
Kutner, The Case Jbr an International Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Rep.r, 37 U. DET. L.J.
605 (1960); Kutner, World Habeas Corpus Jor International Man: .4('redo Jor International
Due Process oJ Law, 36 U. DET. L.J. 235 (1959); Kutner, A ProposalJor a United Nations
Writ oJ Habeas Corpus and an International Court oJ Human Rights, 28 TUL. L. REv. 417
(1954); Kutner & Carl, An International Writ of Habeas Corpus: Protection of Personal
Liberty in a World oJ Diverse Systems oJ Public Order, 22 U. PiT. L. REv. 469 (196 1).
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by this author at the Freiburg Colloquium, which was joined in by
Professors Levasseur and Pisapia and Attorneys Paradiso, Torrisi,
and Giallongo (A.I.D.P. Italy). The following is a translation of
this resolution.
It appears hopeful to substitute in the future to the strictly
national concepts of criminality and to the intransigent consequences
of national sovereignty an international concept of forms of
criminality which [by their very nature] endanger fundamental
human and social values and for [the preservation of] which a closer
cooperation between the states is indispensable.
Consequently and in conformity to the contemporary trend to
attribute to the individual the quality of subject of international law,
it is suitable to recognize that the individual who is the object of an
extradition procedure may uphold before national and international
jurisdictions the prerogatives recognized to him by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and by international treaties.
To this effect and with a measure to foresee a general
international convention, it might be useful that there be organized
regional or international jurisdictions susceptible of hearing
[individual] recourses directed against the decisions of national
authorities rendered in violation of the aforementioned individual
rights.
These jurisdictions could also be seized with a procedure inspired
by habeas corpus which would permit and give a more effective and
practical remedy for the establishment of the Rule of Law on a
world-wide basisY?
94. The 1969 Siracuse (Italy) pre-conference considered this resolution and prepared
a text to be submitted to the Xth International Penal Law Congress (Rome 1969) which
embodied the meaning and spirit of the Freiburg resolution.

WAYNE LAW REVIEW
VOLUME

15

SPRING

1969

NUMBER 2

EDITORIAL BOARD
J. TERRY MoRAN,t Editor-in-Chief
GARY L. SMITHt

DAVID

Survey Editor

A.

CLANTONft

Article & Managing Editor

CARL G. BECKERt
Note & Comment Editor

EDWIN

W.

HECKER,

JR. t

Note & Comment Editor

DAVID D. JoswicKt
Note & Comment Editor

BARRY P.

WALDMAN t

Note & Comment Editor

Senior Staff
RICHARD J. BURSTEIN

WILLIAM J. SHIRLEY
KRIS A. VAN THIELEN

THOMAS C. MATEVIA

KENNETH

A.

JiMm F. WHITE*

NEAL

DANIEL G. WYLLIE

Junior Staff
BRIAN M. BARKEY
ROLAND T. BAUMANN
THOMAS J. BEALE

DAVID

II

W. McMoRRow

WILLIAM B. MURPHY
WILLIAM M. NEWMAN

JAMES E. BERGESEN

WILLIAM

EDWARD M. DERON
ALAN C. HARNISCH

LAWRENCE E. NILL
RAYMOND T. ROWE

ROBERT P. JARESS
JACK R. JELSEMA

PETER SUGAR
SANFORD TANNENBAUM

JOHN D. LAZAR

THOMAS N. THOMSON
RICHARD P. ZIPSER

F.

THOMAS LEWAND

B.

NICHOLS

Faculty Advisors
STEPHEN H.

SCHULMAN,

FREDERICA KOLLER LOMBARD
*

t

Chairman
SAMUEL I. SHUMAN

Designates a recipient of the Samuel Schwartz Memorial Scholarship Award.
Designates a recipient of the Clarence M. Burton Memorial Fund Scholarship.
Member, National Conference of Law Reviews

